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COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES:
AN INVENTORY OF LIABILITY - AN INVENTORY OF
PROBLEMS
Frans G. von der Dunk*

Theoretically speaking, eight different aspects of
"liability" are submitted to be of paramount
importance for any analysis of liability as it operates
vis-a-vis commercial activities. When surveying these
eight paramount aspects of any liability regime, at
the same time by relating them to the specifics both
of space activities and of the space law-liability
regime, as illustrated by 'legal facts' of both
international and national brand, the problems which
remain with respect to liability for commercial space
activities are taken stock of, and the fundamental
character of the relationships between public
international and private liability, respectively
international liability and state responsibility are
highlighted. It is submitted, that any analysis of the
issue of commercial activities and the related liabilityquestions should at least take account of the inventory
of problems thus provided.

Abstract
Wherever commercial activities are undertaken, the
question of liability for harmful effects of those
activities to others is one of the first things to come
to a lawyer's mind. With space activities of course, as
long as endowed with commercial character, it is no
different. Nevertheless, the special character of space
activities as a category and space as an area, reflected
in the corpus juris spatialis which has developed over
the past decades as a lex specialis to the lex generalis
of general public international law, provides this
question of liability with a number of special features
when regarded in this context.
Where time and again confusion arises as to what
"liability" means in theory and, as a consequence,
entails in practice, before focussing on the issue of
liability for commercial space activities it seems
adamant to provide some clarity on these issues to
allow sensible dialogues and discussions. The present
paper therefore purports to survey a number of general
aspects which arise in respect of liability as a notion
common to more or less all municipal legal systems
and to international law as a whole, and then to
analyze briefly how these aspects specifically relate to
the issue of commercial space activities. Hence, an
inventory is made of the most important aspects of
the notion of liability in theory, which should be
helpful in clarifying the specific juridical
consequences of liability for commercial space
activities - and at least focusses discussions. Among
these aspects, some of the most important relate to
the intricate relationship between public international
and private, civil liability, and the relevance of the
notion of the "appropriate state" for the field of
liability. A short comparison with the doctrine of
state responsibility, as it has developed in the stateto-state relationship defined by international law and
transplanted into space law, is unavoidable on some
of the subissues concerned.

1. Introduction
Of course, liability questions are of fundamental
importance for those undertaking commercial
activities of whatever kind. Otherwise succesful
business undertakings could be totally destroyed
merely by the fact that liability has not been duly
taken into account and cared for. The basic question
therefore is, how does liability operate specifically
for commercial'space activities? What risks, what
opportunities does it provide? What specific aspects
of liability are worth scrutinizing by a commercial
enterprise before undertaking space activities?
Liability from the point of view of entities
undertaking commercial space activities may seem
a many-headed dragon. Liability in the legal sense
relevant for those entities is probably best defined
as "an obligation one is in law or justice to
perform", or more to the point, the "condition of
being responsible for a possible or actual loss,
penalty, evil, expense, or burden", or even a "duty
to pay money or perform some other service".l
For a clear insight into the relevance of the topic of
liability for commercial space activities, starting
from such definitions it will be necessary to
develop some further theoretical outlines of the
principle. In that way, a frame of reference will
materialize for any discussion on practical issues
and problems. It is this frame of reference, together
with a few examples and some general concluding
remarks, which the present paper sets out to
present
Liability as a notion, developed and still rooted
very much in municipal legal systems, invites
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mainly on its practical component: is
compensation theoretically unlimited, or are there
caps on liabilities, and if so, how are they
construed? This is the culminating point of
analysis from the point of view of any
commercially oriented entity, since it relates most
directly to the question of whether a specific
commercial undertaking will be profitable or not.

many questions when it comes to activities which
take place in the special international area of outer
space. This holds true, despite the prominent
conclusion of liability as a central mechanism in
the Outer Space Treaty2, as the basis for all
international space law, and the elaboration of that
mechanism·by means of the Liability Convention3.
For example, the question arises what the exact
relation under international space law is with the
twin notion of responsibility, which is also given a
prominent place in the Outer Space Treaty4, but is
not elaborated by means of an additional
international legal instrument. How does liability
for space activities principally operate on the
national level, in view of the international character
of space law - and the international status of outer
space? Where does the fact that most private space
activities are commercial ones, while commercial
ones are often automatically equated to private
ones, come into this picture?
While dealing with those fundamental questions, a
summary analysis will be made of the eight
different theoretical aspects of "liability" which are
perceived by this author to be of importance, as
they appear both on liability in general and on
space law liability in particular. Moving from the
theoretical to the practical, they will provide some
sort of preliminary theoretical checklist, defining
the parameters for the problems of liability for
commercial space activities. The inventory of
problems thus provided, it is submitted, will allow
for a clearer focus when efforts are undertaken to
solve some of the most pressing issues relating to
liability vis-a.-vis private and commercial space
activities.S
As a starting point, the first aspect is that of
arriving at a definition of liability, focussing on
damage as the paramount trigger. A second and
closely related question pertains to the consequences
in abstracto once liability has arisen, especially that
of compensation. A third aspect relates to the
question of the entity liable under a regime at issue,
and the relationship with the causation of the
damage. A fourth aspect relates mirrorwise to the
question of the victimized entity, and its potential
to claim compensation for the damage concerned. A
fifth question then is the mechanism in force to
deal with liability claims between claiming and
liable entities.
Sixthly, narrowing down on how liability is
working - be it still in abstracto - the relationship
between liable and claimant entities is scrutinized,
with a view for example to the rather general
practice of waivers. This relates to the inter partyversus-third party liability dichotomy, and the
comparable distinction between contractual and tort
liability. Seventhly, the character of a particular
liability regime as to absolute, strict, risk or fault
liability, and the question of the burden of proof, is
an important element of any analysis.
Finally, as an eighth point the issue of
compensation will be tackled once more, this time

2. A Further Definition of "Liability"
The first step in this regard is the elaboration of the
definition of "liability" by focussing on how the
principle operates. Liability, as can be glanced
already from the few definitions provided, is a form
of accountability of legal persons towards other
legal persons for specific activities and their
consequences. The many different national legal
systems in which the principle has been elaborated
moreover all have in common that the operation of
the principle is triggered by the causation of
damage. If damage occurs, liability can be invoked
at least in principle; if damage is absent, no issues
of liability could enter discussions. This is also
true for space law.6
Damage is defined for the purpose of space lawliability rather strictly to the extent that it means
"loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or
persons, natural or juridical, or property of
international intergovernmental organizations"7.
Hence, it does not for example include indirect
economic damage, in contrast for instance to the
legal framework originally established for space
station "Freedom "8, or immaterial damage other
than impairment of health as they might be
acknowledged under public international law 9 or
national legal systems.
Another important factor to keep in mind when
discussing liability under the pertinent rules of
space law, is that the principle can only be invoked
as long as the damage in question has been caused
by a space object. I 0 Hence, damage caused for
example to a communications satellite directly
from the earth, without an intermediate role for
another space object, falls outside the scope of the
space law-liability regime - and most probably
outside of any other liability-regime as well.
Although so far this remains theory, the increasing
proliferation of communication satellites and
ground stations, not to speak of the increasing
amount of commercial disputes related to
communications satellites' orbital positions and
frequencies, make for an exponentially increasing
possibility that such occurrences might happen in
the not too distant future. I 1
The role of damage as the sale trigger of liability is
not self-evident however. The International Law
Commission for example has tried to confine the
operation of the principle of liability in public
international law to those cases of damage only
162

space actIVItieS, in terms of the duty to pay
compensation for damage which occurred - would
restitutio in integrum be obligatory under all
circumstances? could punitive damages be awarded?
- with respect to the the consequences of liability
the Liability Convention is quite clear: material
compensation has to be provided.1 8
The relevance of this conclusion vis-a-vis
commercial space activities is obvious. Although
for non-commercial space activities the same
consequences attach to damage and the resulting
liability, it is especially for commercial activities,
undertaken as they are for profit motives, that the
chances of an accident occuring and the average
damage resulting from such accidents should be
calculated as carefully as possible, in order to
discern whether the actiyity in question
commercially speaking is indeed worth undertaking.
Whether the entity undertaking activities includes
liability in its calculations by earmarking some of
its own assets for such occasions, or by insuring
itself with an insurance company against a certain
premium, does not make a fundamental difference
in this respect. If it is taking no chances, it will
also take care of potential obligations to pay
compensation as a consequence of responsiblity
arising.

where no internationally wrongful act, that is no
violation of an international obligation, is at
issue. 12 The reason for adding a second
indispensable trigger of liability lies in the concept
of state responsibility which the ILC is dealing
with more or less simultaneously; and this is the
source of much confusion also on liability.13
Responsibility, as another fundamental mechanism
of accountability operative under public
international law, is triggered precisely by the
occurrence of an internationally wrongful act,
including cases where these acts cause or involve
damage 14. Hence, responsibility threatens to'
overlap in its operation, with respect to cases of
damage, with the operation of liability. Since this
overlap also appears in the Outer Space Treaty and
the Liability Convention, where damage is given
an unequivocal role as the sole trigger of liability
and damage as an important element of an
internationally wrongful act is not excluded under
responsibility, it can not be ignored however.
State responsibility in outer space law, similarly to
general public international law, attaches to states
as soon as certain activities are not "carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the
present Treaty,,15. Since the same treaty includes
an obligation for states to "carryon activities in
( ... ) outer space ( ... ) in accordance with
.international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations" 16, one can safely assume that
responsibility in space law operates no different in
principle from state responsibility in general public
international law .
The consequences of this general structure of
liability (and likewise those of responsibility) under
space law specifically for commercial activities will
only become apparent after going into more detail
as to how liability works, once relevant damage has
been ascertained. In any case, undertaking efforts for
the prevention of damage by oJlle's activities
obviously at this stage would be a wise thing to
do, since damage might directly trigger liability,
and indirectly responsibility in some cases.

4. The Causation of the Damage and the Liable
Entity
At the same time, the above brings us tei the third
aspect of liability, the entity to be identified as the
one who has to compensate for the damage in
question. Here, a peculiar trait of especially space
law-liability becomes apparent. In municipal legal
systems where liability was developed, it attaches
to persons, whether natural or juridical, who could
be held accountable for the occurrence of the
damage because they, in actual fact, caused that
damage. This is what one might call civil liability ,
or private liability if it is kept in mind that public
entities such as states could also be held liable as
long as they had in actual fact caused the damage in
question. In any case, these systems of civil
liability operated within a specific national state,
jurisdiction and legal order.
When liability as a mechanism is transferred to the
international, inter-state level, it can take two
fundamentally distinct forms. The first is a simple
elevation of civil or private liability to the
international level, or more exactly, adding
transboundary aspects to the liability of (private)
legal persons. The entity actually causing the
damage is still held liable in those cases of
transboundary damage. This happened for instance
in air law, where both with respect to liability for
damage to persons and goods on board aircraft 19
and with respect to liability for damage occurring
on the ground 20 (private) carriers or operators are
held liable and will have to compensate the
respective damage.

3. The Consequences in Law of Liability
This leads us to the second issue regarding liability.
The principal consequence of liability being
incurred for damage is a duty for the relevant entity
to compensate such damage. The overlap with
responsibility becomes effective here, since in the
case of international responsibility arising under
space law as well as under general international
law, the responsible state has to provide reparation
for the international wrongful act in question which in principle amounts to a duty to
compensate damage if damage has occurred as a
consequence or an element of the international
wrongful act in question. 17
While nothing has been elaborated further on these
potential consequences of responsibility for certain
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of its Act on Space Activities of 198226 , and the
United Kingdom by means of its Outer Space Act
of 198627 . France has taken the somewhat different
road, partially due to the special relationship of
Arianespace not only with France but also with the
European Space Agency, of a Declaration of
1980.28
As to responsibility under space law, Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty also establishes a
dichotomy between the causator of damage, as part
of an internationally wrongful act, and the
accountable entity, in case of private entities'
activities. A state is also responsible for such
private activities, as long as they are to be
considered national activities of that state. Here
arises the much discussed question of which state is
the "appropriate state", as the state whose "national
activities" are at issue. 29
On the other hand, private entities would only
become involved on this issue to the extent their
states have considered themselves "appropriate
states" and consequently have taken care to include
the consequences of international responsibility in
their national regulation.
Another important aspect of the system of public
international liability in space law from the
commercial point of view concerned the focus of
liability on launching. A state would be liable
because it would be considered a launching state of
the space object causing the damage - even if the
damage was not caused by or during the launch
activities, but for instance by operational activities
in respect of a satellite that had been launched years
before. Especially in view of the recent but
growing practices of selling or leasing satellites in
orbit30, the result is that by contract the sellers and
lessors had to take care, and indeed took care, that
their potential liability (whether directly under
international space law, if they were states, or
indirectly through national legislation, if they were
not) would be derogated to the buyers and lessees.

These treaties essentially are treaties of private
international law, obliging the states parties, where
necessary, to harmonize their national legislation
with respect to cases involving liability
respectively to establish such legislation in line
with the requirements provided for by the treaties.
Only in addition, public inter-state mechanisms
were created by those treaties to help that process of
harmonization.
Under international space law on the contrary
international liability took on the second form: an
elevation of the system of liability as a whole to
the international level, with the subjects of
international law - the states - themselves as the
liable entities. 21 This, importantly enough, even if
the damage concerned was the consequence of a
partially or completely private launch activity.
The Liability Convention provides four criteria for
a state to become a liable entity in respect of a
certain case of damage, through the notion of
"launching state": a state which launches, a state
which procures the launch of, a state whose facility
is used for the launch of, as well as the state whose
te~itory is used for the launch of a specific space
object are to be held liable in case that space object
causes damage. 22
Under the first of those criteria, either a state or a
number of states (co-)launched the space object in
question - and hence are liable in case of damage or a private entity or a number of private entities
launched it - and hence no entity would be liable
under this heading. Mutatis mutandis, the same
applies to the procurement of the launch and the
availability of a launch facility for the launch.
Only on the fourth criterion, focussing on the
territory of the launch, by definition states could
not be replaced by private entities. Thereby,
through this criterion, there would always be a state
which would be held liable for an (otherwise)
totally private launch - the so far theoretical cases
o! launches from Antarctica, the high seas,
arrspaces or outer space left aside.
Obviously, this provision has led those few states
aw~e of the risks of being presented with liability
claIms for damage which was actually privately
caused, to provide some form of national legal
regulation of private launches on their territories in
which ~artial) de~ogation of international liability
to the pnvate parttes concerned, in order to bridge
the gap between the entity legally liable and the
entity actually guilty, played the predominant role.
As we will see23 , for bridging that gap several
modes have been used which have a considerable
impact on the commercial market especially for
launching activities.
Four states have taken care to bridge that gap at all:
three by means of national legislation and a fourth
by means of a special legal construction. The
United States has done so, as soon as truly private
launch activities were made possible, by means of
the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 24 ,
which was amended in 198825 , Sweden by means

5. The Victimized Entity and the Right of
Claiming
Mirrorwise to the third question, the fourth one
becomes to what extent under international space
law private entities or private persons are allowed
to claim if they have been the victims of damage,
or whether here again a truly public system has
been chosen, potentially differentiating between
actual victim and entity allowed to claim.
While the Liability Convention leaves open the
possibility for private legal persons to claim in
certain national courts under national laws31 , it
does not add anything in this context itself - unlike
for instance the air law conventions on such
lopics32 , which at least enlarge the possibilities for
claiming by private entities and obliges states
parties to open up these venues if they did not
already exist.
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The Liability Convention itself establishes only
the possibility for states to claim even if the
damage was partially or completely suffered by
private entities. 33 Private entities are therefore
dependent upon primarily the state whose
nationality they have, if they feel it appropriate or
beneficial to have their claims asserted on the
international level as it is dealt with by the
Liability Convention, and ultimately therefore
upon the importance such a state attaches to the
private interests involved in comparison with the
public interests of the state itself, in terms of
external policies or general economic interests.
On the other hand, once such a state is actually
willing to take up such a claim, it is clear that the
chances of having it honored might be considerably
enlarged, in view of the practical problems of
sueing privately in a foreign court under foreign
law, and the political weight of the state which is
then behind the claim.
In conclusion, to an entity interested in undertaking
commercial space activities, it is therefore
important to establish to what extent it would be
supported by especially its state of nationality, in
case its space object is damaged by a foreign space
object; which is the situation pertaining to damage
of primary importance to space enterprise.

7. The Relationship between the Entity Liable for
the Damage and the Entity Entitled to Claim the
Compensation
As the sixth aspect one should now have a closer
look at a very important dichotomy with respect to
liability, relating to the legal situation in which the
damage takes place. This specifically concerns the
relationship between the causa tor of the damage, or
rather the entity held liable for it, and the victim of
the damage, or rather the entity allowed to claim
compensation for it.
This relationship can be of two kinds. Either it is
explicit and already in existence at the time the
relevant accident leading to damage occurs, whence
that relationship is only given additional weight by
the fact that damage has occurred within its
framework. Or it is implicit and solely based
precisely on the fact that one party is the causator
of the damage sustained by the other party. In law,
the latter relation is translated into that of the liable
entity with the entity entitled to claim
compensation, obviously a legal relationship which
in space law does not cover the factual relation to
the extent the entities involved as causator or
victim are not states themselves.
As it had orginally been developed within
municipal legal systems, in the first type of cases
the damage occurs in the course of an activity
usually either explicitly or implicitly undertaken
under a contract or agreement between the causator
and the victim. This contract liability in a
principled sense COIncides with the inter party
liability which presently is at issue in various
United States court cases between participants in
space activities, some of which are private.39
From a legal point of view, in general dealing with
inter party liability is a matter of the freedom of
parties to contract between themselves. Whether
fault or strict liability is decided upon to apply
between parties, whether an inter party waiver of
liability is included in the contract40 or rather a
very uneven division of liability41, both national
legal systems and certainly international law do not
infringe upon this freedom to contract, other than
provide some framework conditions for the purpose
of protection of the general interests of society and
the public at large. International space law also
does not oblige states to take any action in that
respect. Even states are therefore inter se free to
conclude any inter party liability arrangements in
their commercial agreements on space activities.42
Interestingly enough, in some of the court cases
mentioned before, the fundamental dispute was
about the extent and the applicability of the
freedom to contract, as much as about the
evaluation and contents thereof. 43 It was questioned
whether certain actual events between the parties to
the relevant contracts related to space activities,
were covered by the terms of that contract, or
whether they essentially took place outside of that
contract. In the latter case, conceptually speaking it

6. The Mechanism to Deal with Liability Claims
The aforementioned problems with the potential
differentiation of actual victim and legal claimant
already points forward to the fifth point of interest,
the actual mechanism chosen by space law for
dealing with liability claims. It is a very
appropriate solution for a public liability document
such as the Liability Convention, but thereby
suffers from similar disadvantages from the point of
view of private commercial entities while enjoying
similar advantages.
Under space law, while reiterating the basic public
international duty to first undertake diplomatic
negotiations in order to arrive at a settlement of the
claim,34 the parties can, if these diplomatic
negotiations do not achieve a succesful conclusion,
establish a Claims Commission as a special
mechanism to solve the issue,35
How this mechanism works, has been elaborated
upon several times,36 but since it has never been
actually been set into operation - the only
international claim for damage, in the case of the
famous Cosmos-954, was solved without explicit
reference even to the Liability Convention as a
whole 37 - the advantages and disadvantages of this
system for private persons and commercial entities
so far remain theory. It would most probably be a
long process, drawn out over many years 38 , which
thereby places a heavy burden on any commercial
undertaking involved.
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speak on their own accord instead of as a direct
consequence of international obligations arising
under the Liability Convention, also taken some
measures in respect of inter party liability especially the United States. 53

would almost amount to a case of third party
liability, with one of the partners in the space
activity concerned somehow in the role of the
innocent and unknowing victim (namely by tort) of
damage which was on the other hand somehow
related to these space activities.
Of course, we have arrived here at the general issue
of third party liability, presenting the second type
of liability, where the damage conceptually
speaking is caused to an innocent and unknowing
bystander. Protecting his interests clearly is a
public matter, to be taken care of preferably by
legislative means, since by definition such
bystanders could not protect their interests
themselves by contract or otherwise. Usually, this
sort of liability in municipal systems is equated to
tort liability.44
Hence, this is also the type of liability which a
public legislative document such as the Liability
Convention basically deals with, as one can discern
from the way the Convention is structured. Damage
on the earth or to aircraft in flight is covered by the
Convention to the extent a space object of another
state is the cause thereof45 , and similarly as to
damage occurring in space itself, only damage of
one space object caused by another falls within the
scope of the Convention46 .
An interesting point in this regard is that the
Liability Convention to some extent, despite the
foregoing evaluation, does make a distinction
related to the dichotomy between inter party and
third party liability. By distinguishing between
damage caused on the earth or to aircaft in flight
and damage caused to another space object, and
providing for a much stricter regime in regard of the
former when compared with the latter4 7, the
Convention explicitly makes a distinction between
truly innocent victims who could never have
known the risks they were running and hence could
never have taken factual or legal action to protect
themselves against such risks, and entities which,
although innocent parties strictly from the point of
view of the accident causing the damage, at least
undertook space activities while they were generally
aware of the risks such activities entailed.
It is on third party liability also, that the Liability
Convention at least strongly presumes a national
'filling in' of international liability rules for private
entities, wherever relevant. Thus, indeed, the United
States48 , Sweden49 , the United Kingdom 50 and
France 51 have each in their own way done just
that.
For (private) commercial enterprise however, it has
already become apparent that third party liability is
a rather theoretical issue so far. It is on inter party
liability questions, that companies' interests have
already several times been at stake. It is on those
aspects that a number of disputes have already
reached courts or arbitral tribunals, notably in the
United States. 52 It is also for those reasons, that
the national regulations in existence have, so to

8. The Character of Liability
This brings us logically to the seventh aspect of
liability, the character of liability. On third party
liability, the essential dichotomy is that between
fault liability and absolute liability. The Liability
Convention makes this differentiation very clearly,
providing for absolute liability in case of damage
sustained on the earth or by aircraft in flight, and
for fault liability in case of damage inflicted upon
another space object, its component parts or people
present on board.54
Generally speaking, more terms have been coined
with respect to the potential character of liability
than just the two mentioned in the Liability
Convention, such as strict liability or risk liability.
Nevertheless, the first essential distinction to be
made is between a kind of liability for damage
which applies irrespective of fault, and a kind of
liability for damage which applies only if fault
could be proven.
A subsequent issue arises as to whose fault should
be proven, that of the liable state or that of the
actual causa tor of the damage in case the latter is a
private entity. To the extent fault does determine
liability in space law, the logical conclusion should
be that it is the fault of the causator which counts;
once that is established, the state liable as a
launching state can not disculpate itself by arguing
lack of fault on its own part - or, in other words,
by claiming to have taken due diligence. 55 It is a
launching state, and hence it will have to pay. It
could be added, that with responsibility it works the
same way: once one is an appropriate state, one is
responsible. 56
Only then, further distinctions come into playas to
whether absolute liability is indeed absolute, or can
be escaped from under certain exculpatory
circumstances, to be proven by the party invoking
such exceptions to liability57, or as to whether
there rather is a fault liability at issue with a
reversed burden of prooP8 .
On inter party liability on the other hand this
dichotomy between absolute and fault liability in
practice logically is not important any more.
Usually, a third option is chosen, that of a waiver
of liability with each party taking its own losses.
The only realistic alternative here would be fault
liability - which the Liability Convention provides
with respect to intra-space damage - since otherwise
both parties could end up paying for each other's
damage, with the larger damage of the two getting
the larger compensation rather than the lesser fault.
Only when the question arises, in disputes arisi~g
from inter party liability issues where damage is
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concerned which is sustained within a relationship
of two or more participants to the same activities,
whether the actual instance of damage did not rather
present a case for third party liability, the issue of
fault versus absolute liability again raises its head.
Nevertheless, since the Liability Convention does
not deal with these matters, it remains a matter of
national tort (and/or contract) law to decided
thereupon.

rephrased as: is one party at fault, can only one
party be accused of knowledgeable wrongful or
reckless behaviour or even wilfull misconduct - in
which case the damage sustained by that party goes
uncompensated and the damage sustained by the
other party is to be compensated to the full - or can
both parties be accused of faulty behaviour, and if
so, to what respective extent, since that would
supposedly then define the extent to which one
party's damage would be compensated by the other
party.
As the most important issue in the 'filling in'
operation, all national legal regulations so far have
taken care to bridge the gap on this issue as well be it in different ways and to a different extent.
Under the original Commercial Space Launch
Act 60 , the United States made for unlimited
derogation of any international claim; it was only
by the 1988 Amendments that the United States
government provided, in order to stimulate private
launch activities, a sort of flexible. and not really
unequivocal cap on liability on the national
level 61 .
In France, by means of the Declaration a simple
cap of FF 400 million was put on the potential
extent to which Arianespace would have to
reimburse the French government. 62 In Sweden and
the United Kingdom on the other hand, no cap on
liability was imposed nationally; the system of
unlimited compensation under the Liability
Convention was squarely transferred from the
international to the nationalleve1. 63
All this. of course, concerned third party liability.
Since on inter party liability states had full
discretion to devise their own inter party liability
systems, the extent of national divergence is at
least as large as it is on third party liability. In the
United States, while other cases of inter party
liability were considered to fall under the inter party
waiver clauses of the Commercial Space Launch
Act as amended in 198864 • the special cases where
the government was involved as one of the parties
were ruled by a different system 65 .
The 'partnership' between France, other ESA
member states and Arianespace with regard to the
latter's launchings has been dealt with differently as far as can be detected at this stage. The
Declaration provided for Arianespace to have
"financial responsibility for maintaining in good
operational order the assets made available to it".66
In Sweden and the United Kingdom the authorities
have been left the discretion to decide in actual
cases of applications for licenses upon full and
unlimited compensation also of the government,
while no rules on other cases of inter party liability
were included - mainly because there was no de
facto need. 67

9. The Compensation Itself
The ultimaltely interesting issue for especially
private entities undertaking space activities for
commercial purposes of course is the eighth aspect
of liability: the actual compensation to be paid
once the liability claim is found to be justified. For
this is what entities should insure themselves
against, if national or international law allows
claims to be laid at their doorstep. This is
especially important for space activities in view of
the extraordinary risks they still entail, both in
terms of chances that accidents resulting in damage
might occur, and in terms of chances that such
damage might be of a catastrophic magnitude.
The most obvious point here is the question
whether compensation is unlimited or limited, and
in the latter case, what those limits are and how
they are applied. In space law, the Liability
Convention proceeds from the idea of unlimited
compensation. Space damage in principle is to be
compensated to the full no matter how extensive it
is, for the compensation "shall be determined in
accordance with ( ...) justice and equity, in order to
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as
will restore the [entity suffering the damage] (... ) to
the condition which would have existed if the
damage had not occurred"S9. Only those
considerations of justice and equity may in first
instance mitigate the duty to pay compensation
otherwise only limited by the extent of the damage
itself.
In second instance, another relation between the
character of liability and the question of limitations
becomes apparent in the Liability Convention,
mitigating the extent to which compensation is
only limited by the extent of the damage. In the
cases where fault liability is to be applied namely
the Convention requires compensation of the
damage only to the extent of the fault - not to the
extent of the damage. Still, there is no absolute or
flexible cap posed in an objective and general
manner; only the circumstances of the case can ad
hoc determine the ultimate compensation to be
paid.
Here the special circumstances in which fault
liability is applied by the Liability Convention
playa crucial role. Fault liability applies to damage
occurring in outer space - which means: between
two (or more) space objects. As already alluded to,
this almost amounts to a case for inter party
liability, at least conceptually, and the question
concerning liability here could therefore be
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10. Concluding Remarks
By means of the above survey of eight paramount
aspects of liability at the same time a first survey
has been achieved of the problems arising when it
comes to liability for commercial space activities.
While doing so, moreover, a few special problems
related to for instance the issue of responsibility
have been highlighted.
In overviewing these summary analyses, one other
general red thread may strike the eye. While
commercial space activities are often, implicitly or
explicitly, equated to private space activities, from
a practical point of view this does not hold true.
Space activities for commercial purposes can just
as well be undertaken by public entities, such as
ministries or special agencies and government
institutions, as private entities.
Nevertheless the same regime of liability applies to
both sorts of commercial activities; a difference
only exists to the extent that with public entities
the liable entity is more or less the same as the
causator, whereas with private entities the causator
in law is rather covered by a different entity being
liable. The question therefore becomes what the
importance is of the distinction in legal terms
between public and private entities for an analysis
of liability. This relevance is actually contained in
the term 'level playing field', meaning a free market
environment where all competitors (the 'players')
operate under equal conditions.
While liability at first sight seems to present such
equal conditions as between private and public
commercial undertakings, its consequences turn out
to be different when it comes to the actual
situations prevailing.
The role of launching and its relation with liability
provides the background to this red thread. For
commercial entities, not only in a legal sense but
also in an actual sense launching is the focal
element of all space activities. Apart from the
many aspects of liability directly related to launch
activities, the fact that every true space activity
involves space objects to be launched lends
additional importance to the existence of the global
launch market, whether liberalized or very regulated
or restricted.
Not accidentally therefore, one of the major
problems of global commercial space activities
dealt with at the political level is precisely that
global launch market. Basically, at the moment
two market- and private enterprise-oriented political
forces, the United States and Europe, whatever its
precise outline, are at odds with two formerly or
presently communist, but at any rate not privately
oriented economies, those of the Russian
Federation (in conjunction wiLh Kazakhstan) and
the People's Republic of China.
The ultimate shape which the global. market will
take, obviously will be the outcome of
political/economical rather than legal
considerations, if a globally level playing field is to
be strived after. This in its turn also applies more
generally to other space markets as such as well, be

it that for liability the link with the launch remains
an umbilical cord. On the issue of liability then
already a few aspects can be noted which so far
obstruct the establishment of any level playing
field, both nationally and internationally.
Take the choice between so-called self-insurance or
veritable insurance, for example. Maybe in practice
those commercial entities which are public, and
hence ultimately could lean on public treasuries as
the deepest pockets around, alternatively on
government's power to pressure partners in space
activities into accepting weightier liability
obligations, might tend to prefer to take chances,
whereas private entities involved in commercial
activities, if such liability applies to them, might
rather choose insurance - as long as commercially
reasonable in terms of premiums - than bet the
company.
As soon as public and private entities turn out to
compete in the same commercial market,
distortions may arise due to such inherent (quasi)financial advantages in relation to the actual
consequences of liability of the public entities
among the competitors. This, both with regard to
preliminary arrangements (self-insurance against
third party liability does not require payment of
premiums!) and regarding the situation when it
comes to the actual payment of damages.
Mirrorwise, the distinction between public and
private entities on the point of state support in case
of damage sustained by foreign space activities may
also play a certain role with respect to the level
playing field in a certain market. It is an undoubted
advantage for a public entity, if and when it can
more easily draw upon government support to
assert its claims than a private entity - or even, if
the claims themselves fail, draw upon direct
financial government support as a substitute. Thus,
also in respect of the actual operation of the
mechanism dealing with liability claims under the
Liability Convention, public entities involved in
commercial activities may enjoy similar advantages
of state support in utilizing the possibilities of
diplomatic negotiations or Claims Commission.
That states are left free to conclude inter searrangements on inter party liability, speaking from
a purely commercial point of view, might also
threaten the level playing field for at least launch
activities, globally speaking. After all, the freedom
to contract for private parties still depends upon the
parameters provided thereto by whatever national
legal system they happen to belong to.
Where to a certain extent the important question for
(private) commercial entities with respect to
regulating liability is more one of regulating inter
party liability, it might be that a global level
playing field calls for internationally harmonized
standards of iIiler party liability along the lines of
the Warsaw Convention and the related treaties especially since in the relevant fields relatively
speaking still so many public entities are involved.
Once more, the question ultimately arises therefore
as to the desirability of a global level playing field
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for launch activities, and hence indirectly for all
space activities, and the importance therefore of
harmonized inter party liability arrangements on the
national level, as much as third party liability
arrangements. Providing an answer to that question,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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